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Unsolved Trinity
the case of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Urangoo Bulgamaa1
This research aims to understand transboundary river conflict and cooperation in the context 
of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The study addresses the basin level legal environ-
ment and the reasons for unclosed deal from a perspective of power politics. The paper argues 
that power asymmetry affects cooperation in the absence of a quality institution. To mitigate 
such tension, benefit sharing principle needs to be introduced into the current negotiation, 
while Ethiopia should bring collaborative offers to downstream states in order to balance 
power. Furthermore, building common-ground through managing water-food-energy-envi-
ronment nexus may protect each riparian from the negative impacts of counter-hegemony.
Introduction
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has been currently building over the Blue 
Nile River in the territory of Ethiopia, is in conflict due to the fact that Egypt disagrees on the fill speed 
of the dam (water reservoir) planned by the Ethiopian government, as well as concerns its expected 
impact assessment to the downstream countries. Political tension is high. If the riparian countries fail 
to solve the conflict through diplomacy, it may danger regional peace and stability. Therefore, this case 
attracts international attention. Prior to going in detail, it is worth to provide background for the story.
In North Africa, the Blue Nile, as a major surface water resource, is long being used by Ethiopia, 
Sudan, and Egypt [World Bank, 2018]. The Blue Nile origins from the Ethiopian Lake Tana flows 
through Sudan towards Egypt where flows through the country and finally discharges into the Me-
diterranean Sea.  In fact, the MENA is the most water scarce and water-conflict affected region in the 
world [Caroline A Sullivan, 2014]. Therefore, the role of transboundary water resources in regional de-
velopment and peacekeeping is significant, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
The main driving forces making the situation into a conflict are often described as dependency 
on one major water resource, high population growth, and rapid urbanization, modernization and 
industrialization, migration, a history of armed conflict, and weak relations between the countries 
[Barry S. Levy, 2011]. Furthermore, future water issues are expected to be getting more challenging 
due to the impacts of climate change and rapid population increase [World Bank, 2018]. 
On this background, in 2011, Ethiopia announced its ambitious project so-called the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a sustainable energy initiative, aims to build a hydroelec-
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tric dam with a capacity to generate 6000 megawatts electricity (annually) in the Eastern Nile 
Basin in the territory of Ethiopia [Gebreluel, 2014]. The GERD is estimated to produce energy 
covering full-domestic and some part of regional needs. The dam’s construction work was expec-
ted to be finished in 2015. However, the project has been facing disputes so far due to a disagree-
ment with downstream countries, mainly with Egypt. The main tension is that Egypt does not 
agree on Ethiopia’s consideration – the dam would not affect Egypt’s water share. Egypt’s concern 
is that upstream Nile’s reduced flow will potentially have a substantial negative impact on the 
downstream, particularly to Egypt due to the GERD filling period [Tawfeek, 2018].
The paper structure is as following. Firstly, it will introduce conceptual background, second, 
the paper will briefly review the Nile water treaties and agreements and analyze why the negotia-
tion is long being on hold in regard to the GERD. Finally, the paper will be concluded.
1. Conceptual background
This research aims to better understand transboundary river conflict and cooperation in the 
context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The study addresses first, the Nile Basin water 
agreements, second, the reasons for the unclosed deal (unsolved trinity) & impact of power asym-
metry on cooperation. The analysis is conducted from a perspective of power politics to approach 
the problem, therefore, this session is briefly covering conflict and cooperation of transboundary 
rivers, hydro-hegemony, the concept of integrated water resources and river basin management. 
In water politics literature, the transboundary water conflict and cooperation address relations 
between the states sharing water resources. The main logic is that when you are managing scarce 
water resource – then you are managing conflict (the scarce water resource and conflict has a di-
rect relationship). The key problem in this regard is water allocation [Kliot, 1994]. Furthermore, 
the question may arise is -  in which situation does water conflict occur? Water conflict generaly-
ly occurs as a result of a new dam and water infrastructure development in upstream countries 
and a lack of institutional capacity to mitigate the impacts caused by upstream to the downstream 
countries [Petersen-Perlman, Watson, & Wolf, 2018]. This condition intensifies already existing 
competing behavior of sovereign states that are driven by increasing water demand coupled with 
population growth and climate change risks for relatively scarce shared water resource.
However, conflict can turn to cooperation. The main question is when cooperation occurs?  It 
is often contradicted to competition or conflict, which is described as goal-seeking behavior that 
reduces the gains available to others or fulfills their satisfaction [Milner, 1992]. From a perspec-
tive of international cooperation theory, it is described that 
“cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and 
complementary interests. In such situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their beha-
vior to actual or anticipated preferences of others” [Axelrod & Keohane, 1985: 22]. 
Therefore, there is a drawn conclusion that adaptive capacity is an important factor in re-
solving transboundary water conflict and facilitating cooperation. From a perspective of power 
politics, Zeitoun & Warmer [2006] explained an interaction between water, power, and conflict 
by the theory of hydro-hegemony.
 “The term hydro-hegemony is a hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through resource cont-
rol strategies such as resource capture of integration and containment, so that the balance of power 
ultimately determines riparian interactions over shared resources” [Zeitoun & Warner, 2006:450].
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The theory concerns the key issue who benefits from this relationship over the water. They 
argued that hydro-hegemony can engage in the roles what they prefer through a certain type of 
strategy, and it can result in either positive or negative form of hegemony. 
As it is explained theoretically, positive/dominant hegemonic cooperation appears when 
hydro-hegemony engages in guiding role and it tends to result in an execution of an integration 
strategy. Yet negative hegemonic cooperation normally exploits other riparian countries, and 
hegemon state dominantly benefits from water use [Zeitoun & Warner, 2006]. Such situation 
challenges right to water of other riparian and causes inequality. 
Later, Tawnik [2015] studied the hydro-hegemony in the context of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam, highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of the tactics used by coun-
ter-hegemony, Ethiopia. Her main argument is that even though the GERD is a game changer, 
Ethiopia’s approach engaging this relationship increased uncertainties, thus political tensions 
around the project has increased even after the Declaration of Principles (for reducing tension) 
signed, therefore it may lead the countries to a new order - “contested control” rather than “sha-
red control” over the Blue Nile. Tawnik suggested building trust between the riparian states and 
turning the 2015 Declaration of Principles into a benefit-sharing deal.
P. Perlman, Watson and Wolf [2018] further argued that managing transboundary water is often 
attached with interest and power politics, thereby, it attempts to solve the problems of politics throu-
gh diplomacy among the riparian states. These sovereign states thus often prioritize national interest 
rather than favoring the neighboring countries. When it comes to management of such sensitive re-
source, the individual states pursue their own national interests, thus it tends to mismanage the river 
(water resource) in the absence of strong basin wide institution. Aggarwal and Dupond [2014] also 
elaborated that individual action in an interdependent circumstance done by the states often does not 
yield the desired outcome, but, it can be facilitated by creating an international institution. 
How does institutionalism (creating rules through building international treaties and river 
basin organizations – regime theory) help in managing conflict or cooperation over the transbo-
undary waters? As several water conflict/ cooperation scholars agree that 
“Effective institutional presence may encourage a greater distribution of benefits and may 
offset incentives for unilateral exploitation of the shared resource. Cooperative mechanisms can 
reduce the potential for conflict in ways such as providing a forum for joint negotiations, consi-
dering different perspectives and interests, building trust and confidence, making decisions that 
are much more likely to be accepted” [Petersen-Perlman, Watson, & Wolf, 2018:487].  
The question of how states manage transboundary water resources/conflicts certainly attracts 
many scholars to find a solution in the field. Particular problem identified in the transboundary 
river management between riparian states is the upstream state has no immediate interest in 
cooperation [Dombrowsky, 2007]. In an essence of such circumstance, finding common ground 
and building shared value would particularly pay off as based on rational thoughts. To promote 
the states to have more willingness towards cooperation, there is a need for incentives together 
with robust treaties and effective river basin organization.
As a central answer to question how conflicts on water resources can be avoided, the concept of 
Integrated Water Resources’ management (IWRM) and River Basin Organization have been pro-
moted [Dombrowsky, 2007]. This concept has been developed since 1990s as a newly born but 
widely accepted framework to manage the fragmented water issues. As the Global Water Partners-
hip described:
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“Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a process which promotes the coordi-
nated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems and the environment” [Global Water Partnerships, 2000:14].
The IWRM approach facilitates riparian countries to manage shared waters (which are often 
identified collective action problems) through signing international water treaties (IWTs) and 
establishing river basin organization (RBOs). RBO is the most common approach as providing 
key forums among actors [Gerlak & Scheiemer, 2018]. 
All in all, there is a conclusion drawn that transboundary water conflict in the Blue Nile basin 
needs to be mitigated through effective institutionalism and diplomacy. 
2. Analysis
2.1 A short review on water treaties and agreements in the Blue Nile Basin
There is a history of several water treaties and agreements dedicated to the Blue Nile Basin. 
During the colonial era, an earlier arrangement made between Egypt and Great Britain (behalf of 
Sudan) was the Nile Waters Agreement in 1929. This agreement gives predominant power to use 
Blue Nile’s water to Egypt. [Salman.M.A, 2016]. This agreement extended in 1959, two countries 
decided to use entire water flow of the Nile with the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the 
Nile Water in which who uses how much water is precisely written as 10 BCM for evaporation, 
55 BCM for Egypt, 18.5 BCM for Sudan annually [Salman. M.A, 2016]. 
This agreement allows Egypt to form hydro-hegemon in the basin due to much dominant 
water utilization and having control through resource capturing. It also leads form to negati-
ve exploitative hydro-hegemony due to no fair share recognized to other riparian countries. 
Furthermore, equal right to water of each riparian including Ethiopia is strongly questionab-
le. Such a situation caused historical dispute among riparian states over sharing the Blue Nile 
[Salman.M.A, 2016]. 
In 1993, Egypt and Ethiopia signed on a general cooperation agreement, agreed on the prin-
ciple that they will not modify the Blue Nile if it causes any harmful impact another country, 
furthermore, to consult and cooperate on future water initiatives which potentially bring mutual 
benefit [Dennis Wichelns, 2003]. However, none of these agreements did involve other riparian 
countries along the basin like the Nile Basin Initiative2, and any of the clear framework or legal 
regime was described [Dennis Wichelns, 2003]. 
In 2010, the Cooperative Framework Agreement was signed but not in force [Salman. M. 
A, 2016]. In 2015, three riparian states, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed on the Declaration 
of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project with a commitment to regional 
2 The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), the first river basin international body was founded in 1999, among 11 count-
ries along the Nile Basin, which includes Uganda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tanzania. The initiative was commissioned by the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). NBI aims to facilitate dialogue and 
advance cooperation on the joint water management projects in the Nile Basin. (The Nile Basin Initiative, 2019)
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integration in general. This event is significant in terms of its potential effects on building trust 
between three countries, improving benefit sharing, and addressing common challenges in the 
basin [Rawia, 2016]. The declaration of principle has signed to reduce tension between three 
countries, however, the tension arises [Tawfik, 2015]. Based on this legal background, there is a 
strong need to revisit the international water treaties and agreements to fulfilling current needs, 
recognizing fair share of the Blue Nile River, and providing more equitable and just mechanisms.
2.2 Reasons for an unclosed deal – Unsolved Trinity 
The negotiation on the GERD project has been going on since 2011, it has been taken already 
8 years, the deal is far from the final solution. In detail, Egypt disagrees on the fill speed of the 
dam (water reservoir) planned by the Ethiopian government, as well as concerns its expected 
impacts to the downstream countries during the reservoir filling period. Particularly, Ethiopia’s 
plan to fill the dam is in 5-6 years (strategically), thus it will reduce Nile’s flow by 25% during the 
filling period, while Egypt prefers this process in 12-18 years to take  [as cited in Abdulrahman, 
2019]. This is a mirrored process regarding the project deal informed, however, there are other 
reasons behind it. 
When we look at Egypt’s position in the basin, it dominantly captures most of the river flow 
at an expense of other riparian states, thus Egypt created a hydro-hegemony in the basin, even 
though Egypt’s high dependency on surface water causes its vulnerability. Furthermore, Egypt 
has formed a negative dominant hydro-hegemon as engaging in an exploitative role, although it 
is downstream, since 1929 when the Nile Waters Agreement acknowledged Egypt’s water utiliza-
tion with a direct impact of British colony. Later this situation got worse in 1959 due to the Ag-
reement for the Full Utilization Treaty (see session 2.1). However, Egypt’s long-lasting hegemon 
has been challenged by Ethiopia which announced the GERD hydro-electric project in 2011. 
The GERD comes as a disruptor (so-called counter-hegemon) of an upstream riparian to Egypt’s 
dominance as asking its fair-share of the Blue Nile waters.
In fact, when we look at the pattern of Nile Water share and contribution, Ethiopia uses 1% of 
the water, while it contributes 80% of the water; Egypt uses 80% of the water but contributes not-
hing [Kliot, 1994]. Such an adverse disparity in the basin illustrates how Egypt has been engag-
ing in water exploitation. Principally speaking, Egypt’s historical dependence on only one water 
resource should be taken into account, however, it should not block other riparian development 
effort, need and fair-share of water in the basin [Kliot, 1994; Tawfik, 2015].
From a perspective of Sudan, the Sudanese government supports the GERD as it will nor-
mally regulate the flood, and provide the electricity for agriculture, in this way it meets Sudan’s 
need. Economically, the net economic benefit of the GERD for Sudan and Ethiopia is expected 
to increase in case of better cooperation [Mohammed Basheer, 2018], however, environmentally, 
Sudan will be at high risk of flooding that potentially is caused by the dam’s damage [Mohamed 
Mostafa Mohamed, 2017].  From a perspective of two countries tie, Sudan has a warm relation 
with Ethiopia due to the fact that, first, Ethiopia has a role to mediation during the Sudanese 
civil war [Gebreluel, 2014], second, Sudan’s preference is playing a mediation role in the dam’s 
negotiation while securing an energy deal (hydro-electricity) with Ethiopia in case of the dam’s 
operation starts [Petersen-Perlman, Watson, & Wolf, 2018]. Moving beyond a need of sharing 
benefit in the basin, there is a further question arises.
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– If the GERD is a counter-hegemony, whether granting its operation would really shape basin 
level water cooperation in a sustainable and equitable way? 
Having reflected on this question, we need to take a relationship between power asymmetry 
and effectiveness of cooperation into consideration. Some scholars assumed that a power asym-
metry impacts cooperation opportunity between the states in a way that one who has a greater 
power will more likely be securing its interest on the treaties [A. Zawahri, 2018], while Domb-
rowsky [2007:7] argued that upstream countries have no immediate willingness to cooperate.
 Based on such a linear relationship as observed by Zawahri and Dombrowsky, Egypt might 
continue to disagree on the deal for the GERD’s operation as it is certainly negative to its egoist 
interest and hegemonic position, thus Egypt is gaining time from prolonging the deal for 
somewhat amount of time. Prolonging deal is a possible case in the practice as Aaron T. Wolf3 
mentioned that “water conflict resolution is a long process that takes 10 years, 30 years and 40 
years, meanwhile water resources are being mismanaged and people are struggling and the envi-
ronment is degrading”. The statement was based on his empirical studies over the international 
waters’ conflict and cooperation, and delivered during his presentation “International Waters: 
Global Experience” at the international conference in India [Lewis and Clarklaw, 2013].  There-
fore, Egypt needs to stop looking at national security at first but considering basin-wide solution 
while not hindering its well-being. There are scenarios studied which can be win-win for each 
riparian based on the GERD project and its operation [Habteyes, Hasseen El-bardisy, Amer, Sch-
neider, & Ward, 2015; Reem F. Digna et al., 2018]. Therefore, Egypt should recognize Ethiopia’s 
need of and right to water, and introduce benefit sharing principle into the current negotiation.
On the other hand, an impact of power asymmetry is another reason to think about how to 
be avoiding negative potential impacts from the GERD and making sure the cooperation and 
management that meet other two riparian needs. This is why it needs to build up a strong basin-
wide institution, which is capable enough to coordinate different interests and needs. 
Furthermore, finding common ground among riparian states will have positive impacts on 
cooperation. For this reason, water-food-energy-environment nexus may facilitate three count-
ries to manage their one shared water resource in a more equitable and sustainable manner. 
Because the GERD project is not only water issue but also connected to food, energy and envi-
ronment issues in such ways that water collected in the reservoir will be used to irrigate agricul-
ture and also generate electricity. Water collected in the reservoir could either mitigate climate 
and flood risks or cause shortcomings. Thereby, water-food-energy-environment nexus is an 
interconnected set of issues that define each riparian common security and common interest 
[Petersen-Perlman, Watson, & Wolf, 2018]. Furthermore, Ethiopia needs to stop its coercive and 
unpredictable geopolitical game as it would not help to build trust with Egypt, instead, Ethiopia 
should invite Egypt to collaborate on the GERD in that way it would help to create common 
value, balancing power, and limiting possible negative impacts of the counter-hegemony. 
3 Aaron T. Wolf is a professor of Oregan State University and expert for the interaction between water sci-
ence and water policy, particularly as related to conflict prevention and resolution. He is responsible for the 
research: conflict and cooperation along international waterways (which analyzed 261 international waters, 
its period covers 50 years after World War II) and many more.
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3. Conclusion
The paper analyzed the GERD project and its impact from a perspective of hydro-hegemony 
because the main issue is politically attached to sovereignty and security of the riparian states due to 
the dam building and its further impacts. However, the GERD is a dream of Ethiopia, and its expected 
developmental impact on the country and the region is immense. The project clearly needs to move 
on but it is important to build basin-wide cooperation through diplomacy.  Therefore, building an 
institution – in other words - bringing integrated water resources and river basin management into 
the discussion would serve as an effective tool for cooperation and collaboration. Concerning the 
empirics reviewed, the study is written based on the peer-reviewed articles, books and book chapters. 
To sum up, Egypt’s dependency on the Blue Nile river together with the support of Great Britain 
made it hydro-hegemon in the basin and it remains so far. Nevertheless, the GERD is coming to the 
reality as becoming a counter-hegemony due to its expected operation, amount of resource captu-
ring, hydro-electricity generation as well as its upstream location. This phenomenon has caused a 
low-intensity conflict since 2011 in North Africa. To reduce the tension, creating value and buil-
ding trust are recommended, particularly, it is important to help them recognizing mechanisms 
that possibly enable the win-win opportunities from the GERD operation. For current negotiation, 
the countries agreeing on benefit sharing principle and specifying operational and management 
rules would be a significant progress. Furthermore, balancing power is a next round of issue that 
actors need to address. This could be facilitated by creating common ground, particularly the wa-
ter-food-energy-environment nexus is highly recommended by the international scholars. 
Road to consensus may start from recognizing other riparian’s need of water aside from its right to 
water, which is more human centered approach. Cooperation building may start with acknowledging 
benefit sharing principle to continue their further collaboration. Furthermore, it is important, parti-
cularly to Ethiopia, that making the operational and management rules clear to other actors (Sudan 
& Egypt) during the period of both filling and operation. To avoid negative hegemonic cooperation, 
Ethiopia may introduce joint-management to the GERD project with riparian states. It can be either 
inviting them to invest in certain portion of stocks or sealing a deal on energy trading.
Further research is needed in terms of assessing an impact of power asymmetry on treaty de-
sign as empirical studies currently show conflicting results, thus more refined measurement, more 
accurate databases to identify basin hegemons and asymmetry of power [A. Zawahri, 2018].
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Appendix
“Unsolved Trinity – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”
